September 25, 2003

'Attatukism' Without Attaturk: The Road Out of Iraq for the United States ?

September 25, 2003

R L Norman

JMKeynes@SecularStagnation.Com

There are two political timetables in play — one in Iraq and one in the United States — and they are related. The Bush administration would clearly like to see Iraq adopt a new constitution and hold elections for a new government before American voters go to the polls in the November 2004 presidential and Congressional elections.

During the upcoming American political season, however, casualties will be a highly charged issue. So it is significant that the burden-sharing arrangements in Iraq are unlikely to change fundamentally.

'Carrying the Weight - U S Army', Michael R. Gordon, The New York Times Web Site, September 17, 2003.

Defense Department officials warned this week that ordinary Iraqis increasingly hostile to the American occupation might soon constitute the most formidable foe...

But officials say there is growing evidence that the country [Iraq] is now seen as the epicenter of a struggle between the West and Islam. Fundamentalist Islamic warriors, or jihadists, are being drawn to the country, fighting alongside or perhaps in conjunction with loyalists of the fallen government of Saddam Hussein...

But an Afghan security official, a Pashtun and supporter of the American presence, was blunt in his assessment of American actions. "Unfortunately they don't have faithful Afghan friends," he said. "That is very dangerous for them."

'The Next Phase -2 U S Fronts- Quick Wars, but Bloody Peace', Amy Waldman And Dexter Filkins; The New York Times Web Site, September 19, 2003.

1. American Occupation in Iraq: Difficulties Because of the Iraqi Army

Disbandment

2. Genesis of the Idea of War Against Iraq: Israel's Right Wing Think Tanks

and Sharonization

3. The Iraqi War as an Extension of Sharon's War Against a Palestinian

Compromise

4. The Sharonization of American Middle East Policy and the Iraq War

5. Israel: Notes on the Genesis of Sharonization

6. Disbanding the Iraqi Army: The Beginnings of Madness for American Policy

7. Failure of the Sharonization for America in Iraq

8. Attaturkism in Iraq without Attaturk: A Secular Military as a Moderating

Influence in the Middle East

9. The West Bank Wall: The Future of Israel and the United States

Prepublication Draft

Preface

This document has been in process for several weeks and is not quite finalized. However, a 'pre-publication' draft is being posted, with the understanding that some of the nine sections are incomplete and a final draft may be up to 10 days away. This pre-publication draft is necessary because the issues which this paper deals with are not being covered in the main stream media and it is vital that the Iraqi army be reconstituted fairly soon for these reasons:

1. To serve as a counter-balance against the rising fundamentalist forces, both Iraqi

and those pouring in to fight the United States in a 'clash of culture' type of

conflict described in 1996 by Samuel P. Huntington

2. To give the former soldiers a realistic stake in the survival of a new Iraqi state

3. To serve as a counter-balance against the Baathist forces in the Sunni triangle

4. To begin guarding the very long Iraqi border

The American forces in Iraq are simply too few to cover all the 'bases' there and are being stretched to the breaking point.

To reconstitute the Iraqi army does not mean that the Republican Guard or any of the units known to be especially loyal to Saddam, should be recreated; but that at least 250,000 former soldiers in the old Iraqi army need to be drawn back into something like their former structure and soon. There is not enough time left on the Iraqi patience 'meter', to allow the slow creation of a totally new structure. That ship has sailed and it is probably a matter of no more than several months, before the beginnings of a return to Iraqi sovereignty must begin. In that, France's Prime Minister Jacques Chirac is probably correct.

Time is not on our side in Iraq as Senator John McCain noted recently and the longer that we hesitate in reconstituting the Iraqi army, the more likely it is that the worst of all outcomes may occur; either a slow slide into chaos for much of the region or the rise of a new Islamic dictatorship, allied with Iran and pushing north and east towards the Pashtoon areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan; and westward towards the Hezbollah areas in southern Lebanon. Such a formation would dramatically alter the global balance of power and extend Islamic fundamentalism further towards Turkey and the Balkans; and towards Indonesia.

A major part of the paper is concerned with why the decision to disband the Iraqi army occurred. The paper concludes that this occurred, because Likudnics in the American Pentagon made American policy from a right-wing Israeli analysis of what it might take to permanently suppress the Palestinians; the elimination of several Arab-Muslim armies; Iran, Iraq and Syria being the most prominent. Of course, it is no longer possible to speak publicly of an invasion of either Iran or Syria and it should be obvious to most people, that America's stay in Iraq must be brief. And counter to this Likud view, the Iraqi army is going to be rebuilt; it is only a question as to whether it will be primarily a secular force or more oriented towards Islamic fundamentalism. The question is whether the new Iraqi army will be more 'Turkish' or more 'Pakistani' in outlook. The Turkish military is very secular, while the Pakistani army has larger elements of Islamic fundamentalism.

The failure of this Likud fantasy in Iraq will likely have consequences in Israel. First, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon will find it increasingly difficult to get more and more American aid, even though loan 'guarantees' may be forth coming for a while. Second, seeing Sharon's inability to effectively stop the suicide bombers, the domestic Israeli opposition in the Labor and other moderate parties may again go on a 'peace' offensive and try to reach some accommodation with Yasir Arafat or his successor. As the utter bankruptcy of Sharon's policy of targeting the Hamas and Hezbollah leadership, becomes more obvious, more and more Israeli military people may rebel at being made complicit with Sharon's policies; perhaps fearing that they too may wind up in The Hague one day, trying to defend their actions on the West Bank or in Gaza. Already some signs of restiveness are occurring with the Israeli military.

1. American Occupation in Iraq: Difficulties Because of the Iraqi Army Disbandment

An American army of over 200 thousand soldiers is endangered in a deteriorating environment in Iraq. Their situation is grave because the political support for their mission is slipping at home and there is no support for it abroad. Bush gave a speech at the United Nations on September 23, 2003, but squandered that chance to make some reasonable compromise with the U. N.; deferring to the hard core right-wing of the Republican Party instead. However, the domestic American population is increasingly of the opinion that this war was a bad mistake, but sees no easy way out. The American population is uncertain of what to do at this point, since almost all alternatives, including staying in Iraq are dangerous.

The American army in Iraq is trouble not because it is in a fight for its life with another army, but largely because the 'policy ', which put them into Iraq, was flawed, possibly fatally flawed. For many young Americans, it will be a fatal flaw. This American army has won its war, but the resulting 'peace' has become even bloodier than the initial war. This is the responsibility of the Commander in Chief, George W. Bush. His utter failure in this matter, will probably cost him the election in 2004, but in the meanwhile, life has to continue for American ground troops. And either Bush will have about wrapped this matter in Iraq by the election, or the next president will do so in 2005.

Right after the war ended, the Iraqi military was disbanded and a large proportion of the current chaos is directly and indirectly related to this one act. A fact not well understood by the Bush administration, is that the Iraqi army was not largely a Baathist institution. The Republican Guard was Saddam's most trustworthy force, but the rest of the army was not well indoctrinated and was not Islamized. Today, the American position in Iraq requires that much of this Iraqi army be reconstituted, in the hope that a non-Islamic army may remain a power in Iraq, once the United States departs. Unless this is done now, after we leave and an Islamic government is elected, this new Islamic government will then construct an army more compatible with its religious beliefs. Such an Islamic army will be more likely to support Bin Laden, than an Iraqi army, which is largely secular. In short, a non-Islamic army has to be recreated almost immediately and given several months with which to gel, before the domestic American opposition reaches a tipping point and the vast majority of Iraqis no longer sees the American military as a credible force.

This old Iraqi army has to be reconstituted, some stability hopefully returned to Iraq and American attention returned to Afghanistan, where matters are deteriorating. Whatever the political views of the right-wing in Israel or in the United States for that matter, this is a life and death issue for the American troops in harms way today and it is their well being which has to be made foremost now, since there is very little which this relatively small size occupation force can hope to accomplish without large scale foreign support. Bush however, remains committed to the right-wing agenda of those who elected him, and is not going to make the political compromises necessary for the Europeans to risk the lives of their troops in the vast instability created by Bush's war.

A relatively few car bombers can turn 2003 Baghdad into the Beirut of 1983. Any hope of stability based upon American occupation alone is illusory. And again, the source of the destabilization in both locations was Ariel Sharon and Likud policy. Any supporters of the Sharon policy in the Pentagon or in the Bush administration need to be shown the door.

2. Genesis of the Idea of War Against Iraq:

Israel's Right Wing Think Tanks and Sharonization

For almost twenty years, since before the 1981 war in Lebanon, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has practiced a harsh divide and conquer policy in the Middle East, while in power. Instead of seeing a prospering Middle East as being less of a threat to the small Jewish state, Sharon seems to have seen a chaotic anarchy in the area as more conducive to Israeli security. His 1981 invasion across the Litani River just north of Israel set the stage for chaos in Lebanon for better than 10 years. It also cleared Israel's northern border of the man seen by Sharon as Nemesis, Yasir Arafat, leader of Fatah and of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The price for removing Arafat was however the rise of Islamic-oriented groups such as Hezbollah and later Hamas. By decreasing the relative power of the PLO within the Palestinian movement, these nascent fundamentalist organizations were able to increase their power. It was from these fundamentalists groups, that the suicide bombings first came, not from the secular PLO. Thus Sharon's policy has born bitter results for many Israelis.

Sharon did not come up with this model on his own. The British Empire for many years saw the necessity of supporting the second strongest power in Europe, against the strongest power. Thus for years, they supported Germany against Russia, but when Nazi Germany became a power greater seemingly than Russia, then Britain shifted to a more favorable view of Joseph Stalin. Yet, Sharon's version of this divide and conquer strategy has created to a large degree a religious enemy far less willing to compromise with Israel than the largely secular PLO. Moreover, Churchill generally saw stability as a better outcome than chaos among the other side. Churchill also recognized the absolute necessity of opposing Adolph Hitler, before many other British politicians did; to his everlasting credit.

3. The Iraqi War as an Extension of Sharon's War Against a Palestinian Compromise

Most foreign leaders understand that this 'policy' for destroying the Iraqi government was cooked up in Israel, as a way of trying to force the Palestinians to accept an unacceptable settlement. The French understand very well the global implications for a failed post-war Iraq, but they feel no obligation to allow Ariel Sharon's think tank in Israel to determine European Middle East policy. Having chaos among Muslims may be the Sharon model, but it is a poor way to try to run the globe. As the American casualties mount, this view may soon prevail in the United States as well.

The 'idea' behind this war on Iraq, had little to do with the terror attack on 911, but was quietly pushed by right-wing Israeli supporters after Bush's election in 2000, well before the attack. After 911, it became a major focus of these right-wing supporters. The fact that these ideas fitted into the Armageddon ideology of Christian fundamentalists gave it some additional support in the Republican Party.

The current policy was developed by associates of Benjamin Netanyahu, while he was Israeli prime minister in the late 1990s. Richard Perl was one of these people who worked for Netanyahu. A 'democratized' Arab Middle East was seen as more willing to make peace with Israel, by ignoring the plight of the Palestinians. When George W. Bush become president, Perl and a few associates in the Pentagon began slowly pressing this idea of an Arab 'modernization' starting in Iraq, led by the United States military. Ultimately, this 'modernization' would have included both Iran and Syria. The theory was that, if these states became Western-style democracies, that Israel could make a better deal or even no deal with the Palestinians.

This idea is ludicrous on the face of it. Arab politicians running for office in any Western-style system, would more likely play demagogue to the massive political support which hundreds of millions of the Arab masses seem to have for the Palestinians. The basically undemocratic Arab leaders of today have a more nuanced view of the issue. It is however the armies of various Middle Eastern nations, which Israeli's have had, some concern over, particularly that of Iraq. Netanyahu lost his job to Ariel Sharon and it has been Sharon, which has brought about the Israeli side of this policy into force. Since it has been Sharon who has represented these general views for most of the last 20 years, the term 'Sharonization' seems appropriate.

4. The Sharonization of American Middle East Policy and the Iraq War

The purported 'idea' was that if massive American military power were applied to the area of Iraq, Iran and Syria, then a flowering of democracy would result and Israel could continue to take whatever remaining land from the Palestinians they wished. Actually, I believe that it was the elimination of the Arab armies, which was seen by Israeli leaders as most important in the ability of Israel to utterly dominate the Palestinians. And in many ways, the Likud may have seen the destruction of Lebanese political stability in 1981 as contributing to their long-term goal of dominating the Palestinians. It is a cold, hard and very cynical policy, which has in fact brought a great deal of unnecessary suffering to millions of innocent people, perhaps as many or more as those killed as a result of Saddam's rulership. However much this chaos helped Likud's goals, America felt compelled to intervene in the Lebanon War, to prevent Sharon from completely destroying Arafat. A particularly memorable picture from this intervention is of an American captain yelling at an Israeli tank. A contingent of Marines was placed in Lebanon and in 1981, 241 of them were killed in a massive truck bomb attack. After that, America began decamping.

5. Israel: Notes on the Genesis of Sharonization

[Incomplete]

6. Failure of the Sharonization for America in Iraq

Today, with a huge army on the ground in Iraq, the chaos resulting from America following Likud policy in Iraq may be far more damaging, than Lebanon. Still, to minimize the long-term instability in Iraq, Jacques Chirac's plan to bring about an almost immediate Iraqi-based government is probably the less of the many evils. And the reassemblage of the prior Iraqi army is absolutely required for any government to have any stability. The longer this rebuilding of the army takes, the more likely it is that al Qaeda will become more firmly entrenched.

This whole model was a fantasy, which has been destroyed by the last three months of American occupation in Iraq. America does not have the military power or the money to take this area and mold it into Western ideas of civilization. Since the United States has probably decided to back away from this policy of massive militarization, Israel's right-wing government is going to have to rethink its policy towards the Palestinians. The first rethinking is going to be a retracking of that Wall, back towards the old Green Line separating Israel from the West Bank.

Again, the most important implication of this Likud policy in Iraq, was the disbandment of the Iraqi army. This had not been done to the German army after the Second World War. The Iraqi army was disbanded because some Israeli leaders have seen the Iraqi army as the major military threat to Israel. The implications for the disbandment of several hundred thousand soldiers into a war torn country was not even considered. The Iraqi army was dismembered largely for the convenience of the Israeli military position. The internal Iraqi chaos, which has resulted, has been a major impediment to the American military in Iraq. It breeds more anger and contempt for America by the day and to itself, might one day create a much larger 'Hezbollah', reaching from the Lebanese coast to the eastern border of India.

The Europeans are themselves fools for asking for the job of helping to rebuild Iraq under the United Nations. Bush has wrecked the existing infrastructure in Iraq and has sent a poor country into an even lower standard of living. This has so angered the population, that as the United States Army has recently noted, the biggest danger to American soldiers in the future, may be legions of disaffected average Iraqis. The professional Baathists under Saddam or a later version of Saddamism will continue to attack Americans in the 'Sunni Triangle' and the incoming Islamic 'Lincoln Brigades' will continue to kill Americans. Soon Al Qaeda may get itself established in Iraq, something that it apparently had not been able to accomplish so long as Saddam was in power.

7. Disbanding the Iraqi Army: The Beginnings of Madness for American Policy

[incomplete]

Out of the post war chaos of World War l, the British and the French divided the old Ottoman Empire among themselves, setting up the nation states, which now form the Middle East. Turkey was given a different path and a strong leader evolved, Mustapha Kemal Attaturk. Attaturk wanted a modern Turkey to develop and one of his lasting contributions was the creation of a secular military. And to this day, this Turkish military, whatever its many faults, has remained a largely secular force within the Middle East. Pakistan's military on the other hand has become more Islamized. When America put pressure on Turkey to assist in the Iraq war in early 2003, this partially destabilized the Turkish military, for Islam is a rising political force even in Turkey.

8. Attaturkism in Iraq without Attaturk: A Secular Military as a Moderating Influence in the Middle East

[incomplete]

If there is an alternative strategy in Iraq which makes some sense, it is the idea of rebuilding the army as soon as possible and then leaving. In such a circumstance, what we call democracy might not flourish, but perhaps a version of 'Attaturkism' might. Attaturk created a modern secular Turkey after the disaster in World War l. Probably his most important creation was a secular Turkish military. This military today remains secular and tends to prevent Islamic radicals from having much too say in Turkish politics.

Too much has been made of the Iraqi army being in thralled with Baathism. Most professional officer corps have a dislike for politicians. Usually there are very good reasons for this dislike. It is usually politicians, which get armies into wars and get a lot of soldiers killed. Most officers would like not to fight, unless absolutely necessary. A war may be good for a career, but it can wreck a normal lifestyle, of eating and sleeping fairly regularly. And the social life of even an officer at war, is never that great. If the truth be known, the most likely source of opposition to Saddam was from the officer corps.

This was certainly true of Hitler. The most famous and tragically mistimed attack was in 1944, was led by von Stauffenburg(??) and Irwin Rommel. Both men were ranking officers, who realized that Hitler had led the country into mass murder and destruction. Attempting to represent the Prussian officer corps, they did their very best to send Hitler a fairthewell. They both paid with their lives. We do not know how many officers have tried to kill Saddam, but if there are any survivors of such attempts, these are the men who should be put in charge of the army. This army should aim at 100,000 soldiers in 12 months and 250,000 soldiers within two years, hopefully after our soldiers have retired from the fields of Iraq.

9. The West Bank Wall: The Future of Israel and the United States

The presently rising wall along the West Bank is determining the future not only of Israel's policy towards the Palestinians, but also that of the United States. A wall, which steals too much land from the Palestinians, is a wall, which will have to be rejected by the United States.

As well to fail, the megalomaniacal policy of the Likud, which seems to believe that they can redeem the1930's dream of Zeev Jabotinsky and have all of 1947 Mandatory Palestine, or certainly all the pieces of the West Bank, which they can comfortably hide behind the new wall. This wall will either closely conform to the existing 1948 truce line between Israel and Jordan, or it will zigzag into significant portions of the existing West Bank. Such a wall would try to permanently destroy Palestinian nationalism.

More likely, it would begin to attract the several thousand new Islamic 'Lincoln Brigaders' who are even now slipping into Iraq to fight the United States. After the United States leaves Iraq, probably some time in 2004 or 2005, these seasoned fighters may decide to turn west towards Israel and migrate into Western Jordan and then into the West Bank. There they will continue their war against the 'crusaders', and probably continue various terrorist tactics indefinitely. Israel will have deteriorated into a permanent war state, with the resulting declining economy.

The withdrawal of the United States from Iraq, will force down the Sharon model of confrontation; for without a strong American presence in Iraq, Sharon's policy is almost certain to fail. I believe that this is understood even by Sharon's closest supporters. And in the final analysis, either Bush will be looking as though he is getting those soldiers home by Christmas 2004 or he will spend Christmas 2005 back at the ranch in Texas, as a regular citizen.

In fact, I believe that Bush will lose the election almost regardless of what he does or does not do in Iraq. The economy is adrift and at least 3 million Americans are out of work, perhaps for the long term. Moreover, the military vote cannot be taken for granted in 2004. In the 2000 election, the military wanted less overseas action, not more and that is why many voted for Bush. The Afghanistan battle was widely supported by most Americans and it probably still is. But the mess in Iraq shows how poorly prepared the Bush people were for victory.

Shimon Peres is still a viable Israeli Labor leader and Yasir Arafat is still capable of signing his name. While both men are still alive, peace is yet possible for the Jews and the Palestinians. And ultimately, there will be a peace in Palestine. The only question is how many casualties are required. In some long-term war of attrition between the Jews and the Arabs, as Sharon's policy is heading Israel, the Jews will run out of Jews, a long time before the Arabs run short of Arabs. One of the first major Zionist leaders noted something along these lines many years earlier. Nahum Goldman was at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919 and later ran the World Zionist Organization.

He could have become president of Israel, if he had wanted the job, but Goldman knew his own limitations and his own strengths. He declined the job and kept fighting his own way for a sensible Israel policy towards the Arabs. He died in the early 1980s and never lived to see the murder of Rabin and the rise of Sharon; but his ideas remain useful and may yet provide the foundation for a peaceful Middle East.