War in Iraq: Battle of Berlin, Algeria, Jim Jeffords and George W. Bush

February 21, 2003

R L Norman

Jmkeynes@secularstagnation

Introduction

The Will to Fight

The Battle of Berlin and the Battle of Baghdad

Optional and Non-Optional Wars: Bush's Political Incompetence

Iraq in 2004: Japan Under MacArthur or a Replay of France in Algeria?

Jim Jeffords and Bush's Presidential Attitude

Conclusions: The Political Failure of Military 'Success' in Iraq

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Introduction

Some of the anti-war sentiment in the United States probably comes from the 'usual suspects', those who would oppose almost any military intervention. I am not writing from such a view. I was raised in a family with heavy military traditions. I had considered trying to get into the Naval Academy, but later dropped the idea. My current opposition to this war has to do almost exclusively with the possible disastrous political consequences from a military victory, as from an unlikely but not impossible, military loss or extensive military casualties combined with a victory. When an American military victory may carry as severe political consequences as a military loss, perhaps it is time for the president to reconsider the necessity of that war.

President George Bush seems as oblivious to the very dire political consequences as to the currently collapsing global economy. The last time the global economy was this close to a Depression, then President Herbert Hoover made poor choices and the Republican Party did not regain the White House for almost 20 years. Most of the Democratic Party has made its ambivalence reasonably clear on this war, as has the retired military leadership and the intelligence services. It is commonly understood that the United States homeland could face new terror incidents if Iraq is attacked at this time. Most of the globe's population, from the developed to the developing world, has expressed extreme opposition. No poll of any country has shown a majority of the population in favor of war. If this war fever continues, and if the economy continues to slip, a very heavy bill may come due to the Republican Party in 2004. It is time for the existing Republican Party to rethink this matter and let the president know, while there remains enough time to retrack this disastrous policy.

The Will To Fight

At the end of the military day, what matters most to the soldiers involved, is whether or not they believe in a war. All the technical expertise and all the fine arguments matter to some degree, but it is that will to fight which most matters. At this time, I do not believe that a reasonable case has been made by George W. Bush as to why the United States military should risk casualties in the range of 5,000 to 8,000 American and perhaps ten times that of Iraqi dead and wounded. This does not come from any deep-seated support for Saddam, nor from any long standing hatred of America and/or the existing Republican Party. I do not believe that most American soldiers feel a gut-level conviction of the necessity of fighting Saddam at this time and I'm afraid that a number of Iraqi soldiers may be willing to fight, as much despite Saddam as for any 'positive' Iraqi reasons; largely related to the post-1991 'sanctions' on Iraqi trade.

I did not support the initial 1991 Gulf War, largely because I believed that George H. W. Bush had not made clear it to Saddam what America's position was with regards to Iraq and Kuwait. In fact, April Gillespie, our ambassador had had a discussion with Saddam just prior to the invasion and had told Saddam that America did not get involved in inter-Arab disputes. I could not see American servicemen put at risk just because then President George H. W. Bush had not been able to get his act together in the one part of the world where the majority of the global oil supply existed. Still, the 1991 war was fought within certain political boundaries and realities. Current President George W. Bush seems to be ignoring both in his Iraq policy.

That 1991 war was a relatively easy-fought war for America, but the succeeding decade has left the Iraqi people close to destitute. While it is true that the sanctions have remained in place largely because of Saddam's military research and practice, this has not permitted many thousands of Iraqis to live. Many thousands of died, both because of the after-effects of the 1991 and from the sanctions. Iraqis may be as likely to blame America for the sanctions as to blame Saddam. This may be enough to motivate a number of Iraqis to fight, if war gets started.

The Battle of Berlin and the Battle of Baghdad

A 2003 war will not as easily occur, even if the United States Air Force bombs Iraq for a month. Once the bombing is over, I believe that surviving Iraqis will come out of their bunkers and meet the Allied soldiers head to head. I wish that they would not. I hate the very idea of even one American soldier dying over the issue. While Stalingrad may not be a fair analogy, The Battle of Berlin in 1945 might be. At the very end of the war, when it was clear to almost every German that the war was lost, the Germans put up such a fight over Berlin, that between 250 and 400 thousand Russians were casualties. After Marshall Zhukov rained artillery into Berlin for days and days, after four years of hard fighting on the Eastern Front and with many experienced soldiers already dead, the Germans put up enough of a fight to inflict almost as many casualties on the Russians, as the United States suffered throughout the entire war.

Optional and Non-Optional Wars: Bush's Political Incompetence

What is so troubling about the whole Bush foreign policy, is that while this war is 'optional', in that if we do not fight it, probably America will survive it quite well; there remains the possibility that this president or the next president we elect in 2004, may be faced with some 'non-optional' ground war(s). And this president has so angered our normal allies and so harassed the potential new allies of Eastern Europe, that America is probably held in the lowest repute globally since the Vietnam era, maybe ever. This in turn deprives out military of both steady direct military support from the global alliance structure America built after World War ll and deprives them of political legitimacy to act.

And the source of this global ill-feeling towards America extends directly from the president, who sets both the tone and direction of American foreign policy. This president has set a bullying-tone and a reckless, incompetent direction. The combination of these two has compelled the United States military to shoulder a fight largely bereft of Allies and the United States citizens to shoulder a fresh round of tax cuts for the very wealthy at the same time that $300 billion federal deficits are returning. War itself could easily cost $200 billion, including occupation expenses and American long-term casualties, as always seems to happen after wars. Bush is borrowing money from the children of America, the future tax payers, to fight a war which does not have to be fought at this time and is using the American military to back up this belligerent attitude. It is a combination of actions which could prove catastrophic at the global level.

Iraq in 2004: Japan Under MacArthur or a Replay of France in Algeria?

The most likely outcome of this war is that the U. S. will suffer less than 5,000 casualties and the Iraqis less than 100,000. At the end of war, an American military man will become a temporary czar, much as Douglas MacArthur did in Japan in 1946. A crucial difference however, is that it remains to be seen whether the Iraqi people, such as an identifiable Iraqi identity may be said to exist; will accept even a temporary American military dictatorship. If they do not, then either a general collapse of the existing boundaries of Iraq may occur or the American occupation could turn unpleasant.

An internal collapse of Iraq would result in a destabilization of the Middle East, as each connecting country attempted to grab as much territory as possible. Alternatively the occupying soldiers may face an increasingly hostile Iraqi population and ultimately face the same level of resistance faced by France in Algeria in the late 1950s. There, even widespread and vicious torture of Algerian suspects, did not allow the French a victory. The very government of France was almost collapsed because of differences between the military and the polity over the Algerian War.

The French learned in Vietnam in 1954 about nationalism in Southeast Asia and around 1962 about Algerian nationalism. If ever there was a country with a history of serious military experience in both an Asian and an Islamic area since 1945, surely France is that country. France is trying to tell us something. First, that an angry Islamic country may prove difficult, if not impossible for the United States to rule. Secondly, that this could have ripple effects throughout the entire one billion Islamic people on the globe, of which several million are in France today. George W. Bush seems almost completely blind to this reality.

Jim Jeffords and Bush's Presidential Attitude

After several months of bullying and personal slights in 2001, Republican Senator Jim Jeffords bolted the Republican Party and became an independent. Bush's attitude was so arrogant, that he pushed out the single vote that allowed the Republicans to control the Senate. If this president could not keep peace in this own house, so to speak, how can we expect him to keep peace with the rest of the modernized world, much less to deal with the developing world, of which a very large portion is Islamic.

I have no confidence in this man nor in his policies. Even if he should get us into war and out of it successfully with 'minimal' casualties, whatever 'minimal' may mean to anyone else; the very fact that he was willing to 'play chicken' with both our allies of long standing, as well was with one billion Muslims, this tells me that the man has no business even being the governor of Texas, much less the commander in chief of America's military. At least while he was governor of Texas, there was no foreign policy to speak of. Now, life and death for the very American project may hang in the balance.

Conclusions: The Political Failure of Military 'Success' in Iraq

Even if we succeed in Iraq, especially if we succeed fairly easily, the deep-seated anger of many millions of Muslims may become focused upon America, even more than it is presently. Instead of a few hundred Qeada soldiers, backed by several thousand serious supporters; America may wind up facing several hundred little bin Ladens, backed by hundreds of thousands of serious, committed supporters. At the end of the day, it is not the failure of Bush's policy towards Iraq which should be most feared, but rather its 'success' and the risk of further radicalization and focusing of Islamic anger towards America.